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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court in giving any weight to the results 
of a blood test when no evidence was presented regarding the use 
of proper procedures in drawing the defendant's blood? 
2. Did the District Court err in admitting expert testimony 
of a so called Drug Recognition Expert without adequate 
foundation for the testimony? 
3. Did the District Court improperly give substantive weight 
1 
to evidence contrary to the State's case which was impeached but 
not contradicted? 
4. Did the District Court improperly use theories of "aiding 
and abetting" based on Title 76, Utah Code, rather than the more 
restrictive language of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Code 
Annotated in its ruling that defendant was part of common scheme 
or enterprise? 
5, Did the District Court err in finding sufficient ev.-iuvnce 
of Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to 
Distribute? 
As to the rulings on admissibility of evidence, the standard 
of review is one of whether or not there was a available basis 
for admission. See State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah, 19S6). 
As to the choice of law issue, the standard is correction of 
error. As to the questions of fact, the standard of review is 
that of clear error. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This case is governed in part by Title 42, Chapter, 6, Section 
44(1) and Section 44.10 (5)(a) of Utah Code Annotated; Title 58, 
Chapter 37, Section 8, Utah Code Annotated; and Title 58, 
Chapter 37a, Section 8, Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
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This is an appeal of the Eighth District Court's con* tion 
of the Defendant of the crime of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol or Drugs, a Class B Misdemeanor; Possession of 
Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor; and Posse ision of a 
Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a Second Decree 
Felony, entered by the Eighth District Court on the 10th day f 
December, 1996. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
On or about the 12th day of August, 1996, Deputy Sh n 
Ablanalp of the Uintah County Sheriff's Office stopped a vehi e 
driven by the defendant because the vehicle's taillights did it 
appear to be working. After stopping the vehicle, Dep y 
Ablanalp allowed the defendant to attempt to fix the tailligh >. 
For officer's safety, Deputy Ablanalp asked to search the per m 
of the passenger in the vehicle, one Gina Ziegenhirt. Dep y 
Ablanalp found a zippered pouch containing what he believed .o 
be paraphernalia and methamphetamine inside the pants of : s 
Ziegenhirt. Deputy Ablanalp also believed that the defeno it 
was under the influence of drugs and therefore requested le 
assistance of Deputy Don DeCamp, a so called "drug recognita ." 
expert. Based on Deputy DeCampfs observations, Dep ,y 
Ablanalp's earlier observations, the possible control ad 
substances in Miss Ziegenhirt's pants, and Deputy AblanaJ 's 
opinion that t' \ defendant had been directing Miss Ziegenhi ;, 
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he was placed under arrest for Driving Under the Influence of 
Drugs, Possession of Paraphernalia, and Possession of a 
Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute. Blood was drawn 
from the defendant. Results from testing by the State Health 
Lab indicated that there was methamphetamine residue in the 
defendant's system. Testing by the State Crime Lab revealed 
that the suspected controlled substance found in the pouch in 
Miss Ziegenhirtfs pants was methamphetamine. 
Preliminary hearing was held before Judge A. Lynn Payne on the 
4th of October, 1996. After taking the matter under advisement, 
the charges were bound over for trial. On November 23, 1996, 
defendant filed a request for a bench trial which was grafted. 
Bench trial was held before Judge John R. Anderson on December 
10, 1996. At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Anderson ^ound 
the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of drugs 
without further finding. As to the charges of Possession of 
Paraphernalia and Possession of a Controlled Substance With 
Intent to Distribute, Judge Anderson stated that he found that 
the defendant and Miss Ziegenhirt were involved in a common 
enterprise and therefore found the defendant guilty. The 
defendant waived time for sentencing and was sentenced 
immediately to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison, and two terms of six months in jail to be served 
concurrently at the Utah State Prison. The issue presented to 
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this court involve the weight and admissibility of certain 
evidence received by the court, the indications that tia court 
used the wrong law in evaluating the defendant's condu 4~, and 
the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction in the *se. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in certifying Deputy Don DeCamp as an 
expert in Drug Recognition based on the foundation which was 
presented to the court. While, the defendant stipulated to the 
admissibility of the laboratory report regarding the blood tcken 
from him subsequent to the arrest, the trial court erred a 
giving undue weight to the blood test when inadequate foundation 
was laid by the State for the reliability of the procedures used 
in drawing blood. The trial court in its ruling used a theory 
not allowed for in Title 58, Chapter 37 but rather used law 
concerning common enterprises and aiding and abetting foun I in 
the common law and Title 76 of the Utah Code. The trial court 
misconstrued the impeachment of the co-defendant by the state's 
cross examination as s ostantive evidence. The evidence w s 
insufficient to show the defendant had constructive possessive 
of the controlled substances found inside the pants of the co-
defendant . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED THE TESTIMONY OF 
DEPUTY DECAMP AS AN EXPERT WITNESS. 
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At trial, Deputy DeCamp testified that he had attended a 
school offered by the Utah Peace Officer's Standards ad 
Training regarding the recognition of persons under 1 he 
influence of drugs. Deputy DeCamp professed no othar 
qualifications for this expertise other than this school. He 
could not vouch for the qualifications of the instructors of the 
school. He could not vouch for the scientific principles 
inherent in the examination of suspected drug intoxica ad 
persons. Nevertheless he professed to have the scientific 
expertise to recognize persons under the influence of drugs. 
The Utah Supreme Court outlined the requirements for the 
qualification of scientific experts in the case cf State V. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989). In evaluating the admission 
of expert testimony the Court first examined Rule 7u2 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence which states that: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence of 
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
The court rejected the proposition that only the degree of 
assistance to the factfinder determined admissibility of expert 
testimony. The court discussed the test outlined in Frye V, 
United States, 293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the court 
added a requirement that the proponent of this kind of evidence 
must show general acceptance of the principle or technique (upon 
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which the testimony is based) in the scientific community. In 
imposing more requirements that just helpfulness to the 
factfinder, the Rimmasch Court warned that it was guarding 
against the "tendency of the finder of fact to abandon its 
responsibility to decide the critical issues and simply adopt 
the judgment of the expert despite an inability to accurately 
appraise the validity of the underlying science." 
The Rimmasch court adopted a modification to the Frve test 
which was stated in Phi 13 ips v. Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 
1980). In addition to a showing of general acceptance in the 
scientific, expert testimony must also past as test as to 
whether the sciw^tific basis for the test is "inherently 
reliable." It is the burden of the proponent of the scientific 
testing to lay a foundation establishing the reliability of it 
for it to be admissible. No such foundation was laid here. 
Deputy DeCamp did not ] rofess to understand any of the 
scientific principles upon which he purported to base lis 
opinion. He merely present d a certification without founda ion 
as to its meaning. 
POINT TWO: 
FOR ANY WiIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO A BLOOD TEST, THE TEST MUS4 
BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURES OUTLINED BY 
THE LAW. 
In this cafje, a critical piece of evidence was the result! jf 
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a blood test given to the appellant subsequent to his arrest r 
driving under the influence of drugs. There was testimony f m 
Deputy Ablanalp that the appellant was taken to Ashley Val y 
Medical Center where someone took blood. The appellant thrc : h 
counsel had stipulated that the written test results from fa 
Utah Health would be admissible in lieu of having the i^'o 
technician come and testify personally. The tests were du / 
admitted based on that stipulation. No evidence was present! 
as to who took blood or how it was taken. In 41-6-44.10(5)1 ) 
Utah Code Annotated, it states that "Only a physician, 
registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized unc^: 
Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, IT / 
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic drug content." 
Appellant placed before the court during argument this lack i i 
the foundation and argued that no weight should be given to tlie 
test. The judge merely stated that the stipulation to 
admissibility must have been intended to include a stipulation 
to complete reliability of the process of blood collection, the 
chain of custody, and the results. 
Presumably there are good reasons for the requirement that 
only certain medical personnel may draw blood from criminal 
defendants. It is well within the common knowledge of courts 
that improper handling of samples may pollute them. It is well 
within the knowledge of courts that clean sterile equipment must 
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be used or samples will reflect the nature of whatever cat* ad 
the lack of sterility. While evidence may be admissible upc a 
showing of relevance and some tendency to disprove or prov< a 
material fact, for evidence to be given any weight it still m. st 
meet fundamental criteria of reliability. The blood resu ts 
here taken with no evidence of the proper procedures be ag 
followed are inadequate to that test and should have been gi en 
no value. 
POINT THREE 
IN EVALUATING THE TESTIMONY OF THE CO-DEFENDANT, 
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE SUBSTANTIVE WEIGHT TO FACTS PRESENTED AND 
IMPEACHED, BUT INFERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
At trial/ the State called as its witness the co-defendant# 
Gina Ziegenhirt. Miss Ziegenhirt testified that she reached m 
agreement with the defendant's father, a Vernal resident wher >y 
she financed and participated in a scheme to distribi ce 
methamphetamine in Vernal. The defendant was not present : >r 
that agreement. She testified that the defendant had 10 
involvement and no knowledge of any of the details of ) ar 
agreement with the defendant's father. The defendant's fat ir 
asked the defendant to drive him from the Salt Lake City area co 
Vernal. Miss Ziegenhirt accompanied the defendant and i is 
father to Vernal where she got a motel room. She rode ale ig 
when the defendant took his father home. Deputy Ablan* p 
stopped the vehicle on the way back to the motel. She testif *d 
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that he hardly knew the defendant and had her first real 
conversation with him during the ride to Vernal from Salt I :e 
City. So far as she knew, the defendant did not know she td 
drugs. The defendant was not part of any arrangement to 
distribute or possess controlled substances. 
The State treated Miss Ziegenhirt as an adverse witness < d 
attempted to impeach her testimony. So far as the court u s 
concerned she apparently was not believable. There was no otf^r 
evidence other than her testimony, with the possible exception 
of eye contact between the defendant and Miss Ziegenhirt 
resulting in a nod by the defendant, indicating any relationship 
between them. There was no evidence presented as to any common 
enterprise except the enterprise between Miss Ziegenhirt and the 
defendantfs father. The trial court was vague in its ruling. 
It obviously had to treat as substantive evidence facts contrary 
and opposite to the testimony of Miss Ziegenhirt to reach its 
conclusion of common enterprise. Rather than just conclude that 
she was not being truthful, it went on to believe that the 
opposite of her testimony was true. 
It is a fundamental principle of law that a party may impeach 
a witness by many methods. It may show that a witness has 
motives to lie. It may show that witness had poor opportunity 
to observe an event. It may show that a witness has a poor 
memory. It may even use contradictory statements to show that 
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a person is lying. The use however, of impeachment, is to 
discredit a witness, not to generate substantive evidence. 1 lis 
principle is embodied in many decisions, for example in Delrnie 
V. State, ,362 S.2d 689 (Flu App. 1978) the Florida court n led 
that even prior statements made by a witness could not be used 
for substantive evidence when introduced to discredit 1 lat 
witness. A similar result was reached in People v. McKee, i35 
N.E. 2d 625 (111. 1968) where it was held that the purpose of 
impeachment is to destroy the credibility of a witness, not to 
prove facts used in the impeaching statement. In effect, -.he 
court could have chosen to totally disbelieve the testimony of 
Miss Zigenhirt in this case. It could not however use ler 
statement for any substantive value to the contrary of what \ as 
in it. If the court chose to disbelieve her testimony, :he 
effect be as if she had not testified at all. The case had to 
stand or fall on the remainder of the evidence. Because th re 
was no evidence of any common enterprise, the court's finding of 
common enterprise leads to the inescapable conclusion that tae 
court did treat Miss Zieger. lirt's denials of the defendant's 
culpability as evidence that he was guilty, in error. 
POINT FOUR 
IN CONCLUDING THAT SOME FORM OF COMMON ENTERPRISE 
EXISTED, THE TRIAL COURT WENT BEYOND THE STATUTORY BASIS FDR 
THE CRIME AND USED GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW. 
11 
in this case, the defendant was charged and convicted of i wo 
offenses defined under Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8(1), nd 
Chapter 37a, Section 8, two chapters known commonly known as che 
Controlled Substances Act. Specifically the defendant /as 
charged and convicted of the crimes of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute and Possession of 
Paraphernalia. While it is undoubtedly true that the co-
defendant was in possession of methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia, the defendant was not in possession of either. 
For a finding of guilt to properly enter it must be based ex a 
theory of constructive possession. Constructive possession as 
defined in State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981). A per on 
is in constructive possession of a controlled substance wh re 
the controlled substance is subject to that person's dominion or 
control. In further refining this definition, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Fox 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) approved ttie 
language of United State v. Cardenas, 748 F.2d 1015 (5th CLr. 
1984) stating that "to find that a defendant had construct!/e 
possession of a drug or other contraband, it is necessary :o 
prove that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused end 
the drug to permit an inference that the accused had both tue 
power and intent to exercise dominion or control over the dru ; " 
In this case, the trial court made no finding of any s,,;h 
nexus. The court made no finding that the defendant had either 
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the ability or the intent to exercise control over t * 
controlled substance found in someone else's pants. It base I 
its decision on a theory of common enterprise, Commc i 
enterprise is not explicitly defined within the Utah Code. : 
finds its roots in the principles of criminal responsibility f, r 
the conduct of another found in Title 76, Chapter 2, Sectic i 
202, Utah Code Annotated. That section defines the concept t ; 
aiding and abetting in he commission of a crime. The use c : 
aiding and abetting concepts is prohibited in crimes defined I / 
Title 57. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in State v. Scott. 7 I 
P. 2d 121 (Utah 1987) f hat where conduct may be evaluated und* : 
the general principles of the criminal code and under tl -5 
Controlled Substances Act, the more specific act applied to t) * 
exclusion of the other. A defendant charged with Distribution 
of a Controlled Substance could not be convicted under the 
theory of aiding and abetting other in distribution. Even where 
the evidence may have been sufficient for a factfinder to 
possibly find defendant Scott guilty, where there was the 
possibility that the factfinder used an aiding and abetting 
theory for its verdict, reversal was mandated. This concept was 
validated in State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 where defendant c uld 
not be convicted of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute under theories of aiding and abetting. The 
trial court improperly used such a theory in this case. 
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POINT FIVE 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEVQNO fi> REASONABLE 
DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE. 
Th£re was absolutely no evidence in this case that the 
defendant was in actual possession of any controlled substance 
nor any paraphernalia. If this conviction is to stand, it must 
stand on the basis of constructive possession. The basic 
definition of constructive possession has already been citeJ. 
See State v. Carlson, supra, U.S. v. Cardenas/ supra, and St^.a 
v. EQX, supra. What evidence was there then that the defendant 
had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control? 
What evidence was there of a nexus between the defendant and the 
controlled substance? The defendant was the driver of the car 
in which the passenger in whose pants the controlled substance 
was found. Deputy Ablanalp testified that the defendant made 
eye contact with the passenger while she was being aske-.l 
concerning searching her person and that he nodded his head from 
side to side. Although the urine test is tainted by the state's 
failure to follow its own procedure, there was a test shov^ inq 
controlled substances and/or metabolite in the defendant s 
blood. 
While each case is to be reviewed on its own facts, State \ 
Andgrton, 668 P.2d, 1258 (Utah 1983), comparisons an I 
examinations of other cases on the constructive possession is ue 
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are useful. The shaking of the defendant's head is subject to 
many interpretations, but the most that can be inferred from it 
is that the defendant knew that his passenger had some quant ty 
of controlled substance. The Fox court stated that "persons • o 
might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who mi* t 
even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain i „d 
use the drugs can not be convicted of possession of a control] d 
substance. Knowledge and even the ability to possess do r> t 
equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to mi. .a 
use of that knowledge and ability." The Fox case dealt with 1 o 
brothers who may have resided together in a home where marijuc ia 
plants were being grown. The evidence as to one of the brotht s 
was that he was at the home on an occasional basis, and t) t 
mail was found around the home with his name on it. The coi t 
concluded that it could not even find a case of non-exclus e 
possession. 
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, (Utah App. 1991} this coi t 
reviewed a case similar to this one on its facts. Salas was \ a 
driver of a car. Controlled substances were found wedged ir a 
crack behind Salas. Salas stated that his passenger r 
passengers had put the controlled substances where they we a 
found. This court listed several factor which a court cou d 
review and base a finding of adequate nexus for construct! e 
possession. Salas had knowledge that the controlled substanc s 
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were placed in his car. The defendant had only a tenuous basis 
at best for a finding of knowledge of the controlled substc ees. 
Salas was in a position of having non-exclusive possession 2r 
the items in his vehicle. The defendant was not even in non-
exclusive possession of the controlled substance. His pass ger 
was in exclusive possession thereof. In dicta/ the Salas court 
state that several evidentiary factors could be considered as 
linking a defendant with drugs. This include incriminating 
statements. There were none. These include su^piciius or 
incriminating behavior. There was none. As in Salas, the 
defendant freely allowed the search of his vehicle. The factors 
include the sale of drugs. There was none. The factors include 
the proximity of the defendant to drugs. Salas was closer to 
and in better position to control drug than was the defendant. 
The factors include drugs in plain view and drugs on defendant's 
person. There was none. Citing Anderton, the court noted that 
in finding constructive possession in nonexclusive occupancy 
settings, courts had relied on extensive and detailed facti 1 
evidence. There was no such detail here. 
It has already been argued thai: the results of the blood tt t 
should not be given any substantial weight in this case. f 
this court accepts the results at face value, ihey could provide 
one of the factors cited in Salas, that is, use of drugs. There 
was evidence that the defendant used drugs on some prior 
16 
ccasion. No testimony was presented upon which a finding of 
when the defendant may have used drugs. The value of that 
factor is thus reduced. 
The trial court made no detailed factual findings regarding 
the nexus between defendant's conduct and the finding of the 
controlled substance. Its simple statement that there was a 
common enterprise was contrary to the evidence. It is 
indicative that the court did not find constructive possession. 
CONCLUSION 
The record in this case shows that the court made erroneous 
decision in both the admissibility and the weight to be given 
evidence. The court did not find the defendant guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance nor or possession of 
paraphernalia as defined by code and case law. The court used 
a theory of law which does not apply to this. The conviction in 
this case should therefore be overturned. 
Dated this rf^ day of Aftil.l , 1997. 
Alan M. Williams 
Attorney for Appellant 
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NO ADDENDA IS NECESSARY IN THIS CASE 
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